Q3 bounded SSH provisioning candidate — 2026-11-09

Code: ac33d7246fb4cb25e51f19307e6b603a671c048a, main, strict SSH pull/push passed. Evidence: scratch/runs/20261109-q3-large-provider-stream-repair-2215/.

The Q3 provision consumer now calls provision_ssh_files in tools/q3-provider-upload.py. It invokes the sandbox CLI's documented non-interactive boat --no-update ssh ID COMMAND path. The stream contains individual JSON pin headers and exact file bodies, followed by a session seal; it is not a source or media archive. The receiver verifies streamed SHA/size, fsyncs and publishes the file, then independently rereads its final descriptor before acknowledging the pin. Existing independent remote phase-prelaunch checks remain mandatory. No unchanged live PUT was replayed.

Local pins are verified before the command starts, on the sending descriptor, and during streaming, with descriptor metadata mutation detection. Each file retains an absolute maximum of 30 seconds, including its acknowledgement. Cancellation, refusal, EOF, mutation and deadlines terminate the process group, drain stdout/stderr and actually wait. There is one session and no replay. The prior PUT implementation remains available for its offline regression controls; production Q3 provision uses the SSH candidate.

Tests and seal

The actual provision function, extracted from the owning tracked consumer, passes a 46,853,694-byte generated payload through real OS pipes and the actual receiver. Its traced peak allocation is 181,570 bytes. Both phase barriers occur only on success. Held-writer, command refusal, sending-descriptor mutation, cancellation and premature EOF controls each stop after the first pin, admit neither barrier, reap the sole child and observe both pipe EOFs. These controls inject the command argv; they do not establish authenticated Boat CLI integration or successful transfer of the real media pin.

The existing HTTP/TLS uploader controls also pass. Generated terminal-consumer controls pass, including baseline violation reproduction, held screenshot deadlines, refusal, late reply, planned cancellation and ordinary close, with actual kernel reaps and separate EOF. Phase-staging controls pass two actual local prelaunches, five independently reread manifests and five mutation refusals. Controller pipe/EOF controls pass. The required locked build passes. Initial invocations of three ancillary tests omitted their required output arguments; the corrected commands pass and both logs are retained.

Final seal: fcf6d25263294aa15c7359172102de877591dae5429a5ba58563d98a9718103a. Every one of 945 pins in each of five manifests was independently SHA/size reread in a separate process before allocation. The real media remains at test/binaries/candidates/quake-3-arena-demo-installer/installed/demoq3/pak0.pk3, 46,853,694 bytes, SHA256 e77abad2466f45a0a7ea018445528f9b95a0fe7789fa1abc1a7718bbf0754b08. It was referenced and verified locally, not copied into evidence.

The durable every-CONT full-prefix barrier, both EXIT paths outside ESRCH, sticky failure bounds, original timers and native input guards were unchanged. Shared providers, Nox and Redline were read-only.

Sole authenticated attempt: terminal CLI integration refusal

The first file is build/nfs2se-browser.json, 9,322 bytes. The sender completes its local body writes, then fails in remote-sha-size because the JSON received from the command does not equal the required exact pin acknowledgement. The process actually exits with status 1, with separate stdout/stderr EOF. These local writes do not establish remote acceptance. The task-local remote recovery inventory and attempted final file inspection return no files or runtime outputs.

The returned JSON and stderr text were not retained by this candidate, so the underlying CLI/authentication/framing cause is unknown. The evidence does not prove which component refused the command or whether stdin reached the receiver. Do not interpret the pipe tests as an authenticated large-media transfer success. A future repair needs bounded diagnostics and an actual Boat CLI contract control before another separately authorized attempt.

This first failure was terminal. No retry, PUT fallback, remote admission check, native fixture, original game, Chrome, CDP, guest input, capture or quit followed. There are no images requiring model review. Arena entry, alive play, fire and displacement remain untested. The requested live large-file fix is not established; the concrete blocker is the authenticated command's first pin acknowledgement refusal.

Lifecycle and recovery

Sole box: bx_bgp3wa57, UUID 4b7fc471-e145-476f-845a-3024b0bc7991. Initial expiry: 2026-11-09T22:40:32.139Z. An independent observable watchdog was armed before allocation, with immutable UUID/configuration, PID/start identity, fresh heartbeat and deadline 22:40:32.846075Z. Separate observation verified its identity and configuration before provision.

Before stop, a separate verifier reread 444 evidence files, validated 138 complete gzip streams, zero PNGs and the remote inventory. The single malformed gzip is the expected staging corruption control. Zero unique remote outputs needed retrieval. Exactly one delegated normal stop followed this verification: stop_df60715ecd3f4bfc, completed unforced 22:16:49.168Z. Independent API observation confirms archived, archiveAfter=null. No replacement expiry was returned. The allocator joined with status 0; the actual watchdog wait returned 0 with separate stdout and stderr EOF and unchanged configuration. No owned live box remains.

Git is the source archive. The run records exact Git SHA, a small code patch, small materialized-input patches, prepare command, seal and recovery recipe. There is no source/media archive. Next work requires a separately assigned authenticated CLI integration repair; this worker releases STOP.